S
everal scholars sympathetic to the broad project of postcolonial critique have recently suggested that if it is to retain any critical purchase, postcolonial studies must rethink its commitment to the logic of incommensurability and difference. Long dedicated to exposing the inadequacies of the liberal pseudohumanism that Aimé Césaire denounced in 1950, postcolonial studies must now engage a new discourse with universalist aspirations. This new and fully inclusive concept of human collectivity speaks to what Paul Gilroy has termed our "basic sameness," and it is frequently housed under a term adopted from the natural sciences: species.
1 At our current historical juncture, species thinking emerges as an ethical imperative because it is a conceptual category capacious enough to appeal to our commonality. Species thinking focuses on our common vulnerability in the face of planetary environmental crises such as global warming, and on our common susceptibility to global epidemics such as SARS or swine flu. Recognizing such basic similarities allows us to imagine a genuinely inclusive political project: the appeal of species thinking rests on its environmentally conscious approach to the future that is in all our interests as well as on its attentiveness to new, life-prolonging biomedical advances that promise to deliver health benefits to all humans.
As Ian Baucom has suggested, the turn toward species thinking in postcolonial studies is symptomatic of a broader shift in the humanities.
2 Over the past decade or so, Baucom argues, the boundary between the humanities and the natural sciences has been breached. Especially influential have been the life sciences; Baucom notes that "biology, biomedicine, cognitive neuroscience, genomics, genetics, and ecology" now advance theories about the human being that the humanities, as many have realized, can scarcely afford to ignore (HS 6) . Simply put, research in the life sciences is challenging humanities scholars to recalibrate our now customary suspicion of essentialist and deterministic explanations of human society. The life sciences make assertions that posit a fundamental biological human sameness: current cognitive science, for instance, tells us that, rather than resulting from cultural contexts, human "thought, knowledge, desires, and affects all proceed on a neuronal, that is to say, a biological, basis, and that the mental images constituting the life of the mind are . . . formed in the [neural landscape and synaptic pathways of the] brain." 3 It is the responsibility of the humanities to engage this kind of work, Baucom insists, because it addresses questions that a growing number of humanities scholars recognize as their own. Here, Baucom approvingly cites the work of French philosopher Catherine Malabou, who has drawn on neuroscience to further ponder the question of immaterial and affective labour under globalization . Given his own commitment to postcolonial critique, however, Baucom is especially sensitive to the impact that such a shift toward human commonality and sameness will have on postcolonial studies. "We will need to ask what it means for postcolonial studies, in particular, to make common cause with a concept (the human) whose epistemological coherence and political deployment it has long sought to contest," he notes (HS 9) .
This article examines two such recent efforts to make common cause with "the human" by scholars whose work to date has shaped, and considerably transformed, the field of postcolonial studies: Dipesh Chakrabarty and Paul Gilroy. Despite their deliberately provocative and strategically utopian arguments in favor of species thinking, however, I argue that Chakrabarty's and Gilroy's respective engagements with the life sciences raise new and troubling questions for postcolonial scholarship to tackle. As I show with reference to J. M. Coetzee's novel Life & Times of Michael K and Manjula Padmanabhan's dystopian play Harvest, postcolonially minded writers are already fully engaged with the recent critical turn toward the new humanism predicated on species thinking. Taking my cue from both Coetzee and Padmanabhan, I suggest that for the conversation between species thinking and postcolonial studies to be a productive one, postcolonial studies' first task is to interrogate the underscrutinized recourse to the rhetoric of life preservation that motivates all calls for species thinking.
It is revealing, I think, that, between them, Chakrabarty and Gilroy address all but one of the disciplines that for Baucom comprise the studies to task for being unable to help us deal with the "planetary conjuncture within which humanity finds itself today" (CH 199). 7 The specific planetary situation Chakrabarty has in mind is climate change. Global warming threatens to plunge the planet into a crisis of a scale so unprecedented, he argues, that it "challenges not only the ideas about the human that usually sustain the discipline of history but also the analytic strategies that postcolonial and postimperial historians have deployed in the past two decades in response to the postwar scenario of decolonization and globalization" (CH 198 ). In the time of the Anthropocene, when humans have become a geological force with the capacity to determine the environmental future of the planet, Chakrabarty contends, geological time and the chronology of human history can no longer remain unrelated; global warming is altering conditions on the planet such that history, the discipline that typically studies the last four millennia of human existence for which we have written records, must now be considered in relation to "deep history," the history of the geological, climactic, and biological changes that jointly created the conditions for human existence, a history that goes back several hundred thousand years (CH 208, .
Placing human history and deep history in conversation reveals important new coevalities: according to the clock of human history, the keystones of civilization-"the beginnings of agriculture, the founding of cities, the rise of religions we know, the invention of writing" (CH 208)-date back some ten thousand years. Deep history, on the other hand, sees this as the period when the planet moved from one geological period-the Pleistocene-to the warmer period that is the Holocene. Another example: in human history, the European Enlightenment heralds the age of variously defined "freedoms" that humans have pursued over the last two hundred and fifty years-citizenship, class emancipation, women's equality, abolition, decolonization, civil rights. In geological time, however, 1750 roughly marks the period when "humans beings switched from wood and other renewable fuels to large-scale use of fossil fuel-first coal and then oil and gas" (CH 208). This shift designates the termination of the Holocene, and the beginning of a new geological era: the Anthropocene. 8 The longer view of history provided by geological time shows that the actions that humans have collectively undertaken during their time on this planet did not, until very recently, much matter to the planetary present. Deep history, in other words, looks upon humans as a species: we exist on the planet alongside other distinct species, and, until recently, our history-the history of the human species-was merely "part of the history of life on this planet" (CH 213). In the last two hundred and one species, same difference? fifty years, however, our species has also become a "geological agent" possessed of the ability to affect all forms of life that inhabit the planet (CH 206). To view ourselves as a species, then, is to see ourselves, on the one hand, as one species among many, and to realize, on the other hand, that climate change is a consequence of our collective past actions as a species. Chakrabarty points out, moreover, that we must understand, as environmental science does, that "species thinking" is invested in the future of the planet, for just as climate change results from our past actions, it will also affect us all, universally, in the years to come (CH 213). He draws on the work of Edward O. Wilson to emphasize this point: "We need this longer view [of deep history] . . . not only to understand our species but more firmly to secure its future." 9 Ecological devastation, then, demands a commitment to species thinking and to the shared planetary future that it allows us to imagine. "Species," says Chakrabarty, "may indeed be the name of a placeholder for an emergent, new universal history of humans that flashes up in the moment of the danger that is climate change" (CH 221).
In a curious omission, Chakrabarty makes no allusion to postcolonial ecocriticism, a field that has extensively examined how global warming challenges us to rethink the paradigms of postcolonial studies. Postcolonial ecocritics such as Upamanyu Pablo Mukherjee, Rob Nixon, or Elizabeth M. DeLoughrey fully recognize the importance of species thinking in the face of planetary ecological crises. 10 Indeed, they extend the purview of environmental criticism far beyond the issue of climate change, addressing the myriad forms of ecological destruction that threaten our continued existence on the planet. Nixon's concept of "slow violence," in particular, is conceived specifically to acknowledge the importance of deep history and the universalist thinking it entails. As Nixon explains, slow violence refers to the "staggered" temporal scale of "climate change, the thawing cyrosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes" that produce both human and ecological casualties.
11 And yet, as its title indicates, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor also offers the salutary reminder that the planet's populations are differentially vulnerable to environmental destruction. Like his fellow postcolonial ecocritics, in other words, Nixon refuses to surrender unreservedly to species thinking. We are not all equally at risk, he insists, for, typically, it is "those people lacking resources who are the principal casualties of slow violence." 12 For the purposes of my argument, I am especially interested in how Chakrabarty responds, albeit implicitly, to such cautionary reminders that species thinking can never be fully inclusive. Fully cognizant of the blow that his call for species thinking delivers to postcolonial critique and its characteristic suspicion of universalist claims, Chakrabarty carefully anticipates many such objections and spends considerable time qualifying his argument. Firstly, he clarifies, species thinking is "more like a universal that arises from a shared sense of catastrophe." It is a universal, furthermore, that "cannot subsume particularities" (CH 222). He concedes, therefore, that the effect of climate change will vary according to the power differentials that postcolonial critique typically attends to. Like many postcolonial ecocritics, he speaks of socioeconomic differences, readily admitting that "[climate change] will no doubt accentuate the logic of inequality that runs through the rule of capital" (CH 221). But he insists that this does not compromise species thinking, for neither capitalism nor any other form of critique that sees "humanity as an effect of power" can fully explain the crisis of global warming. Ultimately, he explains, such critiques serve only to deal with human history, with "national and global formations of domination" (CH 221). The problem with critiques such as Nixon's, Chakrabarty implies here, is that global warming does not discriminate along such socioeconomic lines. The magnitude of the crisis of climate change, he notes, "has brought into view certain other conditions for the existence of life in the human form that have no intrinsic connection to the logics of capitalist, nationalist, or socialist identities" (CH 217). At stake in this crisis, in other words, are the very conditions that function as parameters for our continued existence on the planet (CH 218). When our collective life itself is at stake, Chakrabarty suggests, the rhetoric of multiplicity and difference that postcolonial studies appeals to is no longer enough. Instead, we need a form of critique that speaks also to our common (vulnerable) life as biological beings and contributes to our collective survival as a species. In short, "the crisis of climate change calls for thinking simultaneously on both registers, to mix together the immiscible chronologies of capital and species history" (CH 220).
We might well observe that Chakrabarty's position is only as persuasive as it is because he chooses to focus resolutely and exclusively on climate change. It is an astute choice for his argument, because climate change is a form of environmental damage that we, as a species, have caused, and that we, as a species, will bear the consequences of, even as we inflict it upon the many other species that inhabit the planet. What of natural disasters that, unlike climate change, are not necessarily caused by our species? Much more frequently, moreover, regardless of whether they are manmade or not, environmental disasters are preceded by discrimination along distinct socioeconomic lines that make it much more difficult to resort to species thinking. As Nixon points out, "failures to maintain one species, same difference? protective infrastructures, failures at pre-emergency hazard mitigation, . . . failures to organize evacuation plans for those who lack private transport, all . . . make the poor and racial minorities disproportionately vulnerable to catastrophe." 13 Lawrence Summers's infamous leaked World Bank memo is also worth a mention here. In it, Summers, then president of the World Bank, spelled out the impeccable economic logic of effectively dumping large quantities of toxic waste in the poorest countries in Africa by "encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the Least Developed Countries." To do so was doubly efficient, Summers reasoned, insofar as it would appease environmentalists in more developed nations and also redress the globe's toxicity balance by ensuring that environmental pollutants were offloaded onto Africa's "vastly under polluted" environment. 14 In light of such sobering reminders about the importance of race and class in environmental policy, Chakrabarty's appeal to species thinking seems considerably less compelling, and its narrow applicability only to global warming looks increasingly suspect. This is not the line of argument I want to pursue here, however. Postcolonial ecocriticism has already covered this terrain, acknowledging the importance of environmental species thinking, even as it reminds us to treat such calls for collectivity with due caution. I am more interested in examining the disturbing fact that Chakarabarty's brand of environmentalist species thinking appears, ultimately, to be disproportionately concerned with the survival of our own species. Of course, Chakrabarty takes care to point out that the lives of different species are organically interconnected such that "the mass extinction of one species could spell danger for another" (CH 217). But what lends his argument its particular urgency and sense of indisputability is his repeated mention of the fact that climate change poses a threat to our survival, to our continued existence on this planet. "Whatever our socioeconomic and technological choices, whatever the rights we wish to celebrate as our freedom," Chakrabarty insists, "we cannot afford to destabilize conditions (such as the temperature zone in which the planet exists) that work like boundary parameters of human existence" (CH 218, emphasis added). And he is quick to underscore the point again: "We have now ourselves become a geological agent disturbing [the] parametric conditions needed for our own existence" (CH 218, emphasis added).
The unexamined insistence on the survival and life-preservation of humans that ultimately underpins Chakrabarty's defense of species thinking is one of the most noteworthy aspects of his argument. It veers towards anthropocentrism, to be sure, but this anthropocentrism, I suggest, is anchored in a profound and deep-rooted ambivalence toward vulnerability. Our collective vulnerability to the effects of climate change, claims Chakrabarty, is what makes species thinking so imperative. And yet, the terms of his argument imply that this vulnerability can never be fully embraced in its totality because we need always to combat it in order to ensure our own futurity. Vulnerability functions, ultimately, as a state to be fought against, and it is by assuming that we are all, as a species, equally committed to the eradication of this vulnerability that Chakrabarty is able to put his argument across so convincingly. It is an assumption, however, that I want to trouble. In order to do so, I will turn first to remarkably similar conversations taking place in biomedical iterations of species thinking, an area that, unlike environmentalism, has yet to receive sustained attention from postcolonial studies.
Species Thinking and New Medical Technologies
In a sense, there is hardly anything novel or radical in claiming that medical science views the human body as a species body. The sheer fact that similar techniques, treatments, and drugs can be employed to diagnose or treat the diseases, illnesses, and pain that affect us all, regardless of race, sex, nationality, or class, testifies to the existence and, indeed, the necessity of medical species thinking. As a number of sociologists of medicine have argued, however, medical diagnosis and treatment have undergone considerable changes in the past fifty years. 15 Nikolas Rose suggests that the most significant transformation has been brought about by "molecularization." 16 The molecularization of medicine means that we no longer live in the age of clinical medicine that Foucault described in The Birth of the Clinic, his groundbreaking study of the way illness is mapped onto the individual body. The clinical gaze that developed over the course of the nineteenth century, Rose explains, focused on the body as a systemic whole. The interior contents of that body " [were] revealed to the gaze of the physician after death in the post-mortem dissection, visualized in the anatomical atlas" or, alternatively, "accessed in life through any number of devices, starting with the stethoscope, that would augment the clinical gaze and allow it to peer into the organs and systems of the living body." 17 While the clinical gaze has not been entirely supplanted, medical diagnosis and therapy today are increasingly reliant upon a "molecular gaze" that visualizes and understands life "as a set of intelligible vital mechanisms among molecular entities that can be identified, isolated, manipulated, mobilized, [and] recombined." 18 Under the molecular gaze, in other words, life appears as a series of molecular processes: we are all the product of a series of discrete functional properties encoded onto our bodies' proteins as information. one species, same difference?
Molecularization has profoundly altered the scale at which medicine visualizes our bodies and intervenes upon them. Prior to molecularization, our bodies could only be fragmented into various component parts: blood and blood products, organs, and later, eggs, sperm, and embryos could be removed from individual bodies for circulation in laboratories or to be transferred into other bodies. With molecularization, however, even cells and DNA fragments have become observable and extractable, inaugurating new fields of biological inquiry. Molecular genetics, for example, is instrumental in diagnosing genetic disorders such as Huntington's Disease, and depends upon new technologies of visualization as well as upon new techniques for isolating, manipulating, and analyzing DNA fragments. 19 More important for my purposes here, however, is another effect of molecularization: "Whether it is the transfer of genes along with their properties . . . the transfer of treatments from one disease to another, or the transfer of tissues, blood plasma, kidneys, stem cells, molecularization is conferring a new mobility on the elements of life, enabling them to enter new circuits-organic, interpersonal, geographical, and financial." 20 Molecularization, in other words, makes the body absolutely penetrable and its components increasingly manipulable. Most crucially, however, it also renders those components increasingly transferable across bodies of different sexes, races, nationalities, and classes, thereby heightening our awareness of ourselves as members of the same biological species. 21 What makes this contemporary form of medical species thinking especially visible is that the latest medical techniques for life-prolongment depend upon it. As medical anthropologist Lawrence Cohen explains, human longevity increasingly relies on our growing ability to supplement ailing bodies with "complex organic forms: whether molecules, cell lines, tissues, [or] organs" obtained primarily from other human beings. 22 Our increased awareness of the existence and circulation of transferable, life-extending body parts provides a new lens on human biological life; widespread tissue transfer allows us to visualize a new kind of commonality, where, as Gilroy puts it, "the strangeness of strangers goes out of focus and other dimensions of basic sameness can be acknowledged and made significant" (PM 3-4). Tissue transfer underscores both our common susceptibility to ill health and our common interest in healing ourselves.
The specific form of tissue transfer that I will focus on here is organ transplantation. Partially, this is because Harvest, the literary text I discuss below, centers on this procedure. But only partially. My decision is also based on the fact that, to my knowledge, organ transfer is the medical procedure most frequently invoked by humanities scholars who want to examine the possibilities contained within species thinking. I suspect this is due to the high visibility of organ transplantation: thanks to the development of efficient immunosuppressant drugs, transplantation is by now a fairly routine procedure with high success rates, and media discussions of transplantation are typically dominated by the problem of the chronic shortage in transplantable, lifesaving organs. There is also something both profoundly intimate and yet highly spectacular about the act of incorporating another's body part into one's own body. As a result, the mobilization of life and death that transplantation depends upon is especially fertile ground upon which to cultivate species feeling and, of course, species thinking.
Thus, in a book that examines the different "systems and discourses of 'sameness' that deliver others to us," David Palumbo-Liu dedicates an entire chapter to organ transfer because, "in the most intense form of sharing human experience, organ transplants disclose the new commonness, as elements from one body can be inserted into another." 23 Roberto Esposito, the Italian philosopher who has written extensively about immunopolitics, has also lingered on organ transplantation as a phenomenon of interest, precisely because it offers a compelling model of commonality and tolerance that is far removed from the segregationist paradigm of immunity: "Isn't it precisely . . . what is defined as 'immunological tolerance,'" he wonders in a 2005 interview, "that carries with it the possibility of organ transplants?" 24 In a moving autobiographical account of his own heart-transplant surgery published in 1999, French thinker Jean-Luc Nancy too has remarked on the new commonalities that organ transplantation brings into view. "No one can doubt," he says, "that this gift [of the donated organ] is now a basic obligation of humanity . . . , or that-freed from any limits other than blood-group incompatibility (and freed especially from any sexual or ethnic limits: my heart can be a black woman's heart)-this gift institutes the possibility of a network where life/death is shared by everyone, where life is connected with death, where the incommunicable is in communication." 25 And here, finally, is Gilroy, who argues in Against Race that our "awareness of the indissoluble unity of all life at the level of genetic materials leads to a stronger sense of the particularity of our species as a whole." one species, same difference?
Gilroy's qualification about the procurement of transplantable organs is important, for it acknowledges the problem of capital that repeatedly complicates attempts to theorize species commonality. Gilroy doubtless has in mind the problem of organ commodification, which sees povertyafflicted individuals, often in the global South, sell their so-called surplus organs (kidneys, corneas) to patients in the wealthy North. He is hardly alone: Palumbo-Liu, for instance, is quick to mention the differentiations imposed by capital, noting that if new medical technologies shore up new commonalities between us, they also create new forms of commodification that "reinforce preexisting structures of inequality, affluence, [and] need." 27 Similarly, medical anthropologists, most notably Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Cohen, and Catherine Waldby, have documented the rise of illegal organ markets and the rise of new economies in human tissue, with Scheper-Hughes famously observing that the route of illegally traded organs maps neatly onto the circuit of capital in the era of globalization: "from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white." 28 I have chosen to focus on Gilroy because, to my mind, his version of species thinking poses just as radical a challenge to postcolonial studies as does Chakrabarty's. Postcolonial studies has amply demonstrated that racial difference was conveniently conscripted into the discourse of a civilizing mission that rationalized the colonial subject's difference as backwardness, inferiority, inequality, and, ultimately, incomplete humanity. Today, the field continues to alert us to racisms such as Summers's, which allocate a differential worth to individual lives according to their geographical location and racial characteristics. Gilroy, however, suggests that new medical technologies shore up evidence of a species unity under which the idea of racial difference might slowly begin to wither away. An active recognition of this "basic sameness," Gilroy suggests, can lead us "away from 'race' altogether and toward a confrontation with the enduring power of racisms" (PM 9). And while Gilroy recognizes that the species thinking forged by new medical technologies does not do away with the problem of socioeconomic difference, his qualification is offered as a parenthetic comment that is not allowed to mar the vision of the "emphatically postracial humanism" that these technologies harbor for him (AR 37).
What strikes me here are the remarkable similarities between Gilroy's and Chakrabarty's respective defenses of species thinking. Chakrabarty, we recall, argues that climate change targets the core biophysical conditions that are required for us to exist on this planet, conditions that, because they are concerned with our basic capacity-in-common to be alive at all, cannot accurately be understood through the hermeneutic of socioeconomic inequality. Gilroy's primary concern being the possibility of a postracial humanism rather than the challenges of global warming, he dispenses with capital in order to turn not just to the gradually decreased importance of race, but crucially, to its growing irrelevance in the face of remaining alive. "At the smaller than microscopic scales that open up the body for scrutiny today," he notes, "'race' becomes less meaningful, compelling, or salient to the basic task of healing and protecting ourselves" (AR 37, emphasis added). Though neither Chakrabarty nor Gilroy spell this out, then, their arguments reveal that it is the concepts of human life, survival, and longevity (and, by implication, mortality) that undergird their powerful vindication of species thinking.
Prescient as ever, Hannah Arendt unwittingly summed up the concerns of species thinking in 1958. "Political equality," she writes in The Human Condition, "is the very opposite of our equality before death." 29 It is our equality before death that species thinking would have us linger on, in the interests of a postracial society, of a planet that might still be able to harbour human existence. Thus, Gilroy advocates that we embrace our vulnerability and "make that predicament of fundamentally fragile, corporeal existence into the key to a version of humanism that contradicts the triumphal overtones of the anthropological discourses that were enthusiastically supportive of race-thinking in earlier, imperial times" (AR 17). And Chakrabarty, for his part, notes that the crisis of global warming "cannot be reduced to a story of capital," for "unlike the crises of capitalism," the effects of global warming will provide "no lifeboats for the rich and the privileged" (CH 221, emphasis added).
This underscrutinized and supposedly self-legitimating recourse to the rhetoric of (human) life preservation warrants further examination. First, Chakrabarty. His brand of environmentalist species thinking speaks persuasively of our common defenselessness before the planetary phenomenon of climate change, of our common inability to survive natural destruction on the planetary scale upon which global warming operates. To appeal to our commitment to self-preservation in this way, however, is to leave unexamined a fundamental problem that arises when we draw on our common vulnerability as a source for a potentially new kind of thinking: namely, that the same instinct for survival and self-preservation that Chakrabarty is calling upon here is what has led to our present planetary predicament in the first place. Ultimately, Chakrabarty's brand of species thinking prescribes that if we have any emotive investment in securing a future for our species, we must continue as we have done so far, and recognize our vulnerability only to take drastic steps to defend ourselves from it. And so a far more radical possibility-that we recognize, accept, and embrace our vulnerability-is one species, same difference? inevitably foreclosed. For further reflections of this order, we have to return to Baucom's views on species thinking.
Baucom's "The Human Shore" concludes with a reading of Coetzee's Life & Times of Michael K. Coetzee's novel is set in war-torn South Africa; Michael K, the "colored" protagonist, flees Cape Town and travels inland. A former gardener, he eventually decides to stop running away and chooses to subsist off the land in an abandoned farm. Twice he is captured and interned in labor and rehabilitation camps, and both times he escapes to return to his life of cultivating the land. Critics have tended to read the text as an allegory of South Africa's racial politics, most often referring to the camp scenes to focus on the violence to which the inmates are subjected by the sovereign state. Baucom deliberately eschews such interpretations; rather than turning to the novel's representation of war and internment, he looks to what he terms K's "scandalous mode of life" (HS 16). In war-torn conditions where we might reasonably expect survival to be K's sole priority, Baucom suggests, K shocks us with his refusal to commit unquestioningly to the logic of self-preservation, devoting himself, instead, to "the time of natural destruction" (HS 14). As he cultivates a small garden in an abandoned farmhouse, K learns that he is gradually losing his ability to experience the very sensations that would anchor him to his own instincts for survival: "As he tended the seeds and watched and waited for the earth to bear food, his own need for food grew slighter and slighter. Hunger was a sensation he did not feel and barely remembered. . . . There was nothing but bone and muscle on his body." 30 For Baucom, K's mode of existence is profoundly political precisely because it refuses to succumb unreservedly to self-preservation and survival, and depends, rather, upon the acceptance of "our inescapable, natural, insecurity, our ultimate inability to dwell outside the time of natural destruction" (HS 18). K's, in other words, is an existence that, without being suicidal and deathdriven, is predicated upon his ability to remain unfazed in the face of extreme proximity to death. 31 What I find so instructive about Baucom's reading of Coetzee is that he recognizes the problems of anchoring species thinking in a presumed, common attachment to a form of self-preservation that ultimately rejects our vulnerability. Through Baucom's argument, we can begin to see emerge some suggestive parallels between Chakrabarty's commitment to species thinking and what Lee Edelman has termed "reproductive futurism." Michael K's refusal to capitulate to the presumed primacy of survival at any cost resonates with Edelman's call for a queer mode of being that would remain deeply skeptical of the "coercive belief in the paramount value of futurity." 32 More relevant to new medical technolo-gies, however, is the way Baucom's comments clearly reveal the limitations of the biomedical grounds upon which Gilroy builds his defense of species thinking. The problem, to which I dedicate the remainder of this article, is not only that Gilroy presumes, like Chakrabarty, that healing, protecting, and reproducing ourselves should be our ultimate goal; it is also that, by locating here, in our presumed, shared instinct for survival, his chief evidence for the ethical argument against raciological thinking, Gilroy runs the risk of making the desire for health and longevity into a moral obligation.
Harvest and the Regenerative Ethic
To further elucidate this critique, I turn now to Harvest, Padmanabhan's play about the international, interracial organ exchange between buyers in North America and sellers in Mumbai, India. Padmanabhan decided to write Harvest in response to a 1995 notice advertising the first Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation International Competition. The guidelines stipulated that all submitted plays should wrestle with "the problems facing Man on the threshold of the twenty-first century." 33 If the contest's weighty rubric gestured toward species thinking in its would-be benevolent use of the term "Man," Padmanabhan responded with a play that irreverently challenged such universalist aspirations, retaining a resolute focus on geographical location, economic disparity, and racial and sexual difference, even as its dominant theme-organ transplantation-underscored human species unity in biological terms. Her bold, dystopian work duly went on to take first prize. 34 Padmanabhan sets her play in 2010, fifteen years in the future at the time of writing. Geographically, the play transports us to India's most overcrowded city, Mumbai. Harvest opens just as the lives of its protagonists, who have long been poor, unemployed, and prospectless, are about to change dramatically. Om, a young man who has lost his former job as a clerk, returns to his tiny one-room flat in a tenement building after participating in a mysterious job-recruitment session. He announces to his wife, Jaya, and his mother, referred to throughout the play simply as Ma, that he has been selected for the post he has applied for at InterPlanta Services, a multinational corporation that brokers deals between North American buyers of transplantable biological tissue and Indian sellers who, as a last resort, have decided to part with their organs in return for considerable financial compensation. The family soon learns that Om's client is an American woman called Ginni, who wastes no time in furnishing the small apartment with all the modern one species, same difference? appliances and conveniences she is herself accustomed to. Ginni also pays for a "Contact Module" to be installed in the Indian family's home, and through this high-tech device, she is able to establish frequent audiovisual communication with the family, usually through unannounced appearances that allow her to monitor the family's daily routine. When the day of Om's transplant finally arrives, he cowers in fright and allows InterPlanta's employees to take away his younger brother Jeetu-a male prostitute and Jaya's secret lover-instead. This supposed accident, however, actually plays straight into the hands of the American organ-buyer. Ginni, it turns out, was never a real person-only a computer-generated image created by Virgil, the actual, male client who uses Jeetu's body parts to regenerate his own deteriorating body. All along, it transpires, Virgil's plan has been to use Jeetu's body to seduce Jaya into having a child with him. The population of the United States, we learn, is afflicted with chronic infertility. The play ends as Virgil, desperate for a child, tries his best to persuade Jaya to undergo artificial insemination.
Although new reproductive technologies make an appearance at the play's conclusion, Harvest's exploration of biomedical technology centers primarily on organ transplantation. As Padmanabhan reveals in a brief essay entitled "The Story of Harvest," transplantation actually inspired her with the idea for a play. While on an early morning walk around Chennai during a visit to her sister in early 1995, Padmanabhan encountered "an odd assortment of strollers, wearing pajamas, dressing gowns and sterile gauze mouth-masks." 35 Enquiries revealed that they were all recovering from kidney-transplant surgery, which they had undergone not because they suffered from kidney disease, but because they had sold one of their healthy kidneys to a rich buyer in need of a transplant. Into this new biomedically enabled relationship between poor and rich, Padmanabhan thought she could "insert the classic theme of age cannibalizing youth in the quest of longevity," and Harvest accordingly features a frail, ailing, but technologically resourceful man who preys on vulnerable, young, but healthy populations to avail himself of their vitality. 36 Padmanabhan places her characters in India and the United States, but she insists that these geographic coordinates are flexible. "Ideally," she says in a production note inserted at the outset of the published script, "the [organ] DONORS and RECEIVERS should take on the racial identities, names, costumes and accents most suited to the location of the production. It matters only," she states with finality, "that there be a highly recognisable distinction between the two groups, reflected in speech, clothing and appearance" (H 6). Here, Padmanabhan tacitly acknowledges that human tissue need not circulate internationally or interracially; economic disparity, she implies, is the main factor to con-sider. And yet she notes, intriguingly, that "for the sake of coherence" she has made her donors Indian and her receivers North American (H 6). To my mind, this assertion reveals that, from Padmanabhan's vantage point in the Indian subcontinent, new medical technologies raise questions that are more sharply exposed through the use of geopolitically and racially differentiated characters; Padmanabhan's own play makes more complete sense to her, that is to say, when she can place these technologies in a plot that never ceases to remind us that the world has been shaped by colonialism and is now structured by the forces of global capitalism. Accordingly, she introduces into her play an international dimension that we do not find in the stories of the Chennai organ-sellers who first inspired her. The upshot is that, through its Indian sellers and American buyers, the plot of Harvest requires us to wrestle with both the question of capital and the issue of racial difference. In the production Padmanabhan envisages, at least, the flow of organs deliberately mirrors the global circuit of capital, and Virgil's eager incorporation of the intimate bodily tissue of his Indian clients demands that we examine the postracial aspects of the transaction.
Through the conceit of a legalized transnational market in human organs, Padmanabhan underscores that Virgil is able to obtain another man's life-prolonging bodily tissue due to his decidedly postracial outlook, but also thanks to his own wealth in contrast to Om's poverty. Virgil's attitude toward race is on full display thanks to the play's clever use of theater's scopic dimension. The cast of racialized actors that Padmanabhan envisions for Harvest calls upon the audience's technologically unenhanced, nonmolecular gaze to perceive the difference between the receivers' white bodies and the donors' brown ones even as they witness Virgil's flagrant disregard for that difference when he willingly incorporates their body parts into his own. The economic divide between the US and India, too, is revealed as a crucial factor in Virgil's ability to secure longevity. As he explains to Jaya, economic disparity is the key ingredient in his plans for organ procurement: "We began to live longer and longer. And healthier each generation. And more demanding . . . . So we designed this programme [i.e InterPlanta Services]. We support poorer sections of the world, while gaining fresh bodies for ourselves. . . . I'm one of the stubborn ones! This is my fourth body in fifty years. . . . Two were not successful. It hasn't been easy. . . . But so long as I can afford to keep trying-I will" (H 86).
I want to dwell further on these comments, however, in order to suggest that Harvest pushes us to wonder about Virgil's motives. Yes, Virgil is willing to overlook the racial difference between him and most people in the "poorer sections of the world." Yes, he is rich and can therefore one species, same difference?
"afford" to live longer. But neither fact can explain why Virgil considers living longer to be such a worthy pursuit. Virgil's remarks are interesting precisely because they reveal how the ability to secure another's life-extending tissue becomes easily conflated with the desirability of doing so. In Virgil's case, in fact, the ability to obtain another's organs seems to translate into an obligation or duty to do so. The conflation, I argue, produces what I want to call a regenerative ethic, an unquestioned commitment to the possibility of revitalizing one's underperforming body, renewing one's health, and extending one's lifespan. It is this regenerative ethic that Virgil is firmly in the grips of, such that he is unable to consider even the possibility, despite the considerable pain and suffering he has undergone, of ceasing the hunt for "fresh bodies." If we are to avoid the pitfalls of biomedical species thinking, then it is the regenerative ethic, or the ready assumption that life prolongment is a self-legitimating pursuit, that we must probe.
If my desire to question why Virgil should want to live longer seems jarring, then we begin to get an inkling of the sheer ubiquity of the regenerative ethic, of the normative investment in longevity that conflates the possibility of extending one's life with the desirability of doing so. It might be tempting to read Virgil's behavior in terms of sheer survival instincts but, as Cohen notes, to do so would be a mistake. In fact, it is important, Cohen argues, to refuse to see the act of availing oneself of another's life-prolonging tissue "as an obvious condition, as a general or anthropological will to life." 37 The specific case of organ transplantation in aged patients, he suggests, is instructive here, for it indicates that new medical technologies are radically altering the relationship we can have to our own mortality. Indeed, for those who can afford it, "the availability and normalization of organ transplantation in late life collapses a right to life with . . . a 'demand for life. '" 38 Ironically, the recourse to the "survival instinct" narrative that Cohen warns against is the driving force behind Gilroy's argument for species thinking. Gilroy's vision of a postracial future that will accommodate the entirety of the human species, we recall, assumes the ethical primacy and worthiness of "the basic task of healing and protecting ourselves" (AR 37). In Harvest, Gilroy's sentiment is witheringly transformed into the robotic customer-service speech of InterPlanta's guards. "I and my colleagues," states one such guard after completing Om's initial briefing, "deeply appreciate the contribution you are about to make towards creating a healthier, happier and longer-lived world" (H 18). Gilroy, of course, is careful not to erase the problem of commodification and capital as InterPlanta's guard does: he recognizes that tissue transfer is sometimes achieved "by dubious means." But Padmanabhan reminds us that the radical, postracial potential of new medical technologies that Gilroy wants to harness is mobilized thanks to his capitulation to a normative regenerative ethic that does not differ too much from the guard's. Both appear to presume that life is ultimately a self-legitimating and unquestionable goal.
Padmanabhan urges us also to be skeptical of Gilroy's postracial vision. By visually invoking it with a racialized cast and a segregated stage, Padmanabhan asks us to consider race's role today, when the appropriation of organic, bodily resources reproduces the familiar racialized patterns of colonialism and expands them into the terrain of life and regeneration. Only in that terrain, and only if we subscribe to its unexamined assertion that the pursuit of life is self-legitimating, Padmanabhan suggests, is it possible to speak of postraciality. Thus, race cannot altogether disappear from Padmanabhan's horizon; her critique of the regenerative ethic alerts us to the profound irony that the postracial, molecular outlook paves the way for an exploitative relation that is often parsed along racial lines, even though race is no longer evoked in this relation because it has been succeeded by a commitment to regeneration.
By asking us to reflect on Virgil's longevitist quest, Padmanabhan is able to expose the underside of Gilroy's strategically utopian vision for "an emphatically postracial humanism" (AR 37). Virgil's willingness to overlook race, her play suggests, is undeniable, but to celebrate his postracial stance is to be diverted and distracted from the major form of exploitation that it permits. It is hardly a cause for celebration, surely, that Virgil's postracial outlook actually enables his predatory behaviour. As for the tasks of protecting and healing ourselves, Harvest shows us that they are by no means as unproblematically "basic" as Gilroy and the regenerative ethic would have us believe. Rather, under scrutiny here is the unequal geopolitical distribution of our ability to heal and protect ourselves from disease, for that distribution sees people like Om increasing their vulnerability to disease so that Virgil can decrease his.
Padmanabhan's ultimate critique of Virgil's commitment to longevity and regeneration arrives at the play's conclusion, in a stand-off between him and Jaya. Through Jaya, Padmanabhan identifies a way of resisting Virgil's advances, of getting him to interrogate his assumption that money and medical technology will procure for him the longer life he so desperately wants. Jaya's strategy-she calls it "winning by losing"-is all the more effective for its ability utterly to confound Virgil (H 90). As the play's final scene begins, Virgil's plan is unfolding to perfection: he now has Jaya all to himself, and he is confident that they can reach an agreement. Where Virgil comes from, they have lost the ability to have children; Jaya, meanwhile, has long wanted a child. He makes one one species, same difference? final proposal: he will impregnate her and they will both get what they yearn for. Initially captivated, Jaya recoils when she realizes that Virgil does not plan to travel to Mumbai to be with her. Her environment "is too polluted for him," he explains; he will send her "a device . . . an implant" and "take her through the procedure, step by step" (H 88). Once again, Padmanabhan underscores the limits of Virgil's postracial outlook: the fear of miscegenation and racial contamination might not be at stake here, but Virgil's dread of Jaya's unquarantined surroundings and his fear of unprotected sexual intercourse belong in a knotty historical legacy that is firmly immersed in racialized politics. Jaya, of course, understands this, but realizes also that she has unwittingly stumbled upon Virgil's vulnerability. She informs him that she will not consent unless he comes to her in person. "I want real hands touching me," she states. "I want to feel a real weight upon me" (H 89).
An increasingly alarmed Virgil tries his best to win her over, but Jaya will have none of it. She lays down an ultimatum: "If you want me, you must risk your skin to get me" (H 89). Matching her actions to her words, she tells Virgil of her plan. "I'm collecting all the pills and medicines I can find. I'm going to take the ones for staying awake, until I run out of them. And if I don't hear the sound of your own hand on my door before that time, I'll take my life. If the guards cause me any discomfort whatsoever-I'll take my life. If you do anything other than come here in person, I'll take my life!" (H 91).
The play ends on this inconclusive note, but Jaya has the last word. "I suggest you take some rest," she advises Virgil. "You have a long journey ahead of you and it's sure to be a hard one" (H 92). Through Jaya, Harvest insists that it is wrong to presume that longevity, reproduction, and regeneration are universal goals, and suggests that Jaya's unflinching embrace of risk and vulnerability is, in fact, a radical refusal to capitulate to Virgil's obsession with the reproduction of life. That, I argue, is how we must interpret the epithet "winning by losing": as in Life and Times of Michael K, at stake here is a mode of existence that, without being suicidal, will not succumb to the presumed supreme necessity of selfpreservation and survival.
Ultimately, the respective works of Padmanabhan and Coetzee force us to question the appeal of species thinking for postcolonial studies. To focus on our commonality as a species is a wishful distraction from questions regarding economic difference and the current iteration of racialized politics, questions that should continue to preoccupy those of us in the field. More unsettlingly, however, species thinking is an unthinking imposition of an ethics of human life preservation that creates new forms of exploitation in the terrain of life itself and ultimately fails to interrogate the relationship of survivalism to our current planetary predicament.
It might be clearer than ever that we belong to the same species, and yet it is clear also that this might not amount to promising change: one species, same difference. To expose the dangerous presumptions and economic inequities that propel the new narrative of universality that is species thinking, the work of postcolonial studies must necessarily dwell at the intersection of the humanities and the life sciences. A new task emerges for the field: to interrogate the limits of species thinking, both in its environmental and its biomedical guises. Postcolonial ecocriticism has already reenergized postcolonial studies with its critique of environmental species thinking. By radically asking us to reinterrogate our entire framework for existence on this planet and to pose difficult questions about the relationship of survival ethics to our current planetary predicament, Coetzee's novel pushes postcolonial criticism to seek new and exciting alliances in posthumanism and queer theory. 39 Harvest reiterates the importance of attending to the medical branch of the life sciences and impresses upon us the need to be vigilant in the face of new, life-extending medical developments. Together, these works spell out the continued relevance of postcolonial studies. The field must show anew that the longstanding inequalities of race, capital, and gender remain in place and cannot be broached with the utopian impulse of species thinking. But we might also offer some new insights: we might show, for instance, that in the aftermath of the civilizing mission, carried out "for the good of the native," the fear of vulnerability has allowed a new, vitalist mission to emerge, carried out in the name of a longer life for us all. And, inspired by Jaya and Michael K, we might also seek out a new, nonbellicose relationship toward vulnerability that will require us to rethink our relationship to our own futurity.
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